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I 
SUPREME COURT PREVIEW 
WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE 1990-91 TERM 
Institute of Bill of Rights Law 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
Friday, September 21 
12:30 p.m.--1 :00 p.m. 
Law School Lobby 
Registration 
1:05 p.m.--2:15 p.m. RELIGION AND SPEECH 
Room 119 
What is the future of the Establishment Clause? What do cases such as Employment Division, 
Oregon Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith portend? What is the future of the Court's free-
speech jurisprudence? What do last term's decisions in U.S. v. Eichman, Osborne v. Ohio, 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., and Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, for example, portend? 
New case: Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, No. 89-1217 (Lyle Denniston) 
Panel: Lyle Denniston, Bruce Fein, Ruth Marcus, Tony Mauro, Bob Nagel, Ron Rotunda, Ed 
Yoder 
2:30 p.m.--3:30 p.m. PRIVACY 
Room 119 
What is the future of privacy under the Constitution? What should we make of Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health from last term? What is the fate of Roe v. Wade? 
New cases: New York v. Sullivan, No. 89-1392 (Suzanna Sherry) 
Perry v. Louisiana, No. 89-5120 (Steve Wermeil) 
(Please note that New York v. Sullivan will be argued at a moot court on Saturday--Fein v. 
Dellinger.) 
Panel: Suzanna Sherry, Steve Wermeil, Nat Hentoff, Linda Greenhouse, Kathleen Sullivan, 
Richard Carelli, Erwin Chemerinsky 
3:45 p.m--5:00 p.m. EQUALITY 
Room 119 
What is the future in this area? What, for example, can we discern from Metro Broadcasting v. 
F.C.C. from last term? 
New cases: Powers v. Ohio, No. 89-5011 (Michael McConnell) 
Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, No. 89-1080 (Tony Mauro) 
(Please note that Board of Education v. Dowell will also be a moot court case on Saturday--
Rotunda v. Chemerinsky) 
Panel: Michael McConnell, Tony Mauro, Walter Dellinger, Aaron Epstein, David Savage, Mel 
Urofsky, Stephanie Garrett, William and Mary Law Student Journalist, The Advocate 
5:00 p.m. Reception 
Law School Lounge 
Saturday, September 22 
9:00 a.m.-9:30 a.m. 
Law School Patio or Lounge 
9:30 a.m.--10:30 a.m. 
Room 119 
Coffee 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 
New cases: Minnick v. Mississippi, No. 89-6332 (Ruth Marcus) 
Harmelin v. Michigan, No. 89-7272 (Mel Urofsky) 
Arizona v. Fulminante, No. 89-839 (Linda Greenhouse) 
Burns v. Reed, No. 89-1715 (Michael Gerhardt) 
Panel: Ruth Marcus, Mel Urofsky, Linda Greenhouse, Michael Gerhardt, Suzanna Sherry, Ed 
Yoder, Kathleen Sullivan 
10:45 a.m.--11 :45 a.m. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ISSUES 
Room 119 
New cases: Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls Inc., No. 89-1215 (Nat Hentoff) 
Pacific Mutual Ufe Insurance Co. v. Haslip, No. 89-1279 (Aaron Epstein) 
Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, No. 89-1598 (Ed Yoder) 
U.S. v. R. Enterprises Inc., No. 89-1436 (Kathleen Sullivan) 
Panel: Nat Hentoff, Aaron Epstein, Ed Yoder, Lea Brilmayer, Michael Gerhardt, Neal Devins, 
Michael McConnell 
11 :45 a.m.--1 :30 p.m. 
1 :30 p.m.--2:30 p.m. 
Room 119 
Break for Lunch (on your own) 
THE COURT'S FUTURE DIRECTION 
(This will include a profile of David Souter) 
Panel: Richard Carelli, Lea Brilmayer, Bob Nagel, Steve Wermeil, Lyle Denniston, David 
Savage, Stephanie Garrett, William and Mary Law Student Journalist, The Advocate 
2:45 p.m.-3:15 p.m. 
Moot Court Room 
MOOT COURT: 
Board of Education of Ok/ahoma City Public Schools v. 
DcYrNeIl 
Ron Rotunda representing Board of Education 
Erwin Chemerinsky representing Dowell 
The Court: Bob Nagel-Chief Justice, Neal Devins, Stephanie Garrett, William and Mary Law 
Student Journalist, The Advocate, Michael Gerhardt, Edwin Yoder, Lyle Denniston, Lea 
Brillmayer, David Savage, Mel Urofsky 
3:30 p.m.-4:00 p.m. MOOT COURT: 
Moot Court Room New York v. Sullivan 
Walter Dellinger representing New York (attacking the regulations) 
Bruce Fein representing HUD (defending regulations) 
The Court: Linda Greenhouse-Chief Justice, Richard Carelli, Aaron Epstein, Tony Mauro, Ruth 
Marcus, Nat Hentoff, Suzanna Sherry, Kathleen Sullivan, Steve Wermeil 
Religion and Speech 
/89-1217 LEHNERT v. FERRIS FACULTY 
ASSOCIA TION 
Public employees-Mandatory union dues-First 
Amendment. 
Ruling below (CA 6, 881 F2d 1388, 132 
LRRM 2088): 
Teacher union's expenditures for costs of con-
ventions, lobbying and electoral campaigns, ac-
tivities on behalf of persons not employed in 
plaintiff's bargaining unit , strike preparation and 
public relations activities, and miscellaneous pre-
fessional activities were reasona bl y undertaken to 
implement or effectuate duties of union as exclu-
sive representative of public employees, and as 
such were constitutionally chargeable to non-un-
ion employees through their service fees. 
Question presented: Do First and Fourteenth 
Amendments permit public employer to compel 
objecting non-union public employees to contrib-
ute, as condition of their employment, to costs of 
following activities engaged in by their exclusive 
bargaining representative and its state and na-
tional affiliates: (a) activities on behalf of persons 
not in employees' bargaining unit, including em-
ployees in other states and different professions, 
and retirees; (b) lobbying at state and federal 
levels on measures not for ratification of, or 
authorization or appropriation of funds for, bar-
gaining agreement covering employees' bargain-
ing unit; (c) electoral politics, including cam-
paigns concerning ballot issues; (d) public 
relations activities; (e) non-bargaining activities 
related only generally to employees' profession; 
(f) meetings of affiliates that primarily serve 
political and ideological purposes; and, (g) threat-
ening and preparing for illegal strikes? 
Petition for certiorari filed 1/30/90, by Ray-
mond J. Lajeunesse Jr., of Springfield , Va. 
Privacy 
'/89-1392 NEW YORK v. SULLIVAN 
Abortions-Counseling-Restrictions on informa-
tion-First Amendment. 
Ruling below (CA 2, 889 F2d 40 I , 58 L W 
2293): 
Federal regulations that prohibit abortion 
counseling and referral by family planning clinics 
that receive funds under Title X of Public Health 
Service Act do not violate constitutional rights of 
pregnant women or Title X grantees . 
Questions presented : (1) Do new regulations 
promulgated by Department of Health and Hu-
man Services under Title X of Public Health 
Service Act that prohibit abortion counseling, 
referral, and advocacy in programs funded under 
act, and that require physical separation of Title 
X-funded facilities and facilities engaging in 
abortion-related services, violate woman's and 
health professional's First Amendment rights? 
(2) Does regulations' prohibition of abortion 
counseling and referral in Title X-funded pro-
gram violate woman's constitutionally protected 
privacy right to make fully informed decision on 
whether or not to continue her pregnancy? (3) Do 
regulations' ban on funding of abortion counsel-
ing and referral and requirement of physical 
separation violate congressiona l intent underl ying 
Title X ? (4) Are new regulations arbitrary and 
capricious because they reverse longstanding 
agency policy in absence of any intervening 
change in circumstances and because change in 
policy admittedly was politically mot iva ted? 
Petition for certiorari filed 3/ 1/ 90, by Robert 
Abrams, N .Y. Atty. Gen., O. Peter Sherwood, 
Sol. Gen., Suzanne J. Lynn and Sanford M. 
Cohen, both Asst. Attys . Gen ., Victor A. Kovner, 
New York City Corp. Counsel, and Lorna Bade 
Goodman and Gail Rubin, both Asst. Corp. 
Counsel. 
.189-1391 RUST v. SULLIVAN 
Abortions-Counseling-Restrictions on informa-
tion-First Amendment. 
Ruling below (New York v. Sullivan, CA 2, 
889 F2d 401 , 58 LW 2293): 
Federal regulations that prohibit abortion 
counseling and referral by family planning clinics 
that receive funds under Title X of Public Health 
Service Act do not violate constitutional rights of 
pregnant women or Title X grantees. 
Questions presented : (1) Do regulat ions pro-
mulgated under Title X of Public Health Service 
Act that prohibit abortion counseling, informa-
tl?n, and referral in ,federally funded family plan-
mng programs, whIle simultaneously requiring 
provision of information to "protect the health of 
. . . [the) unborn child" and referral to prenatal 
care providers that "promote the welfare of . .. 
[the) unborn child," impermissibly discriminate 
on basis of viewpoint in violation of First Amend-
ment? (2) Do regulations that require physical as 
well as financial separation between services pro-
VIded by and those prohibited under Title X, as 
construed by Department of Health and Human 
Services, impermissibly burden ability of petition-
ers to provide abortion counseling, information, 
and referral with non-Title X funds in violation of 
First Amendment? (3) Do regulations that re-
quire health professionals working in Title X 
programs to provide their patients with incom-
plete and medically inappropriate information 
regarding subject crucial to informed choice be-
tween terminating pregnancy and carrying it to 
term violate Fifth Amendment? (4) Are regula-
t!ons that prohibit abortion counseling, informa-
tIOn, and referral in Title X programs and require 
such programs to be physically as well as finan-
cia~l ~ .separate from these newly "prohibiter' " 
a~tlvltles , as determined by Secretary, consistent 
WIth language and intent of Title X and otherwise 
within Secretary's authority ? 
. Petition for certiorari filed 3/ 1/ 90, by Rachael 
PIne, Janet Benshoof, Lynn Paltrow, Kathryn 
K.olbert, Louise Melling, Norman Siegel, Arthur 
EIsenberg, Laurie Rockett, and Hollyer, Jones , 
Brady, Smith, Troxell , Barrett & Chira, all of 
New York, N .Y. 
/ 
/89-5120 PERRY v . LOUISIANA 
Capital punishment-Insane persons-Adminis-
tration of anti-psychotic drugs. 
Ruling below (La SupCt, 5/ 12/ 89) 
Petition for supervisory or remedial writs is 
denied without opinion. 
Questions presented: (I) Do Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments prohibit state from forcibly 
injecting insane death row inmate with mind-
altering drugs when such drugs are not used for 
treatment but are administered solely in attempt 
to make him competent to be executed? (2) Is it 
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment 
to circumvent prohibition of Ford v. Wainwright, 
477 U .S. 399, 54 LW 4799 (1986), against ex-
ecuting insane person by forcibly injecting insane 
inmate with mind-altering drugs in a ttempt to 
make him sane, particularly when court's order 
imposes no limits whatsoever on these injections? 
(3) What standard applies to determine whether 
Louisiana inmate is competent to be executed? 
(4) Do that standard, Eighth Amendment, and 
Ford v. Wainwright prohibit execution of person 
who has been unanimously diagnosed as suffering 
from major psychotic illness, whose sanity, even 
on medication , varies from moment to moment , 
and who varies "like moving target" in his appre-
ciation for crime for which he was convicted and 
punishment that he has been condemned to suf-
fer? (5) Is Fourteenth Amendment violated when 
trial court receives ex parte communications from 
state department of corrections and then relies 
upon them in reaching its decision to order forc-
ible injections, without giving defense notice or 
opportunity to be heard? (6) Is it denial of right 
to counsel for court to have inmate interviewed 
without counsel being notified or being allowed to 
be present? 
Petition for certiorari filed 7/ 10/89, by Keith 
B. Nordyke, June E. Denlinger, and Nordyke and 
Denlinger, all of Baton Rouge, La., and Joe 
Giarrusso Jr. and McGlinchey, Stafford, Mintz, 
Cellini and Lang, both of New Orleans, La . 
Equality 
'/ 89-5011 POWERS v. OHIO 
Jury selection-Peremptory challenges- Racial 
bias-Exclusion of blacks from white defendant's 
jury-Standing. 
Ruling below (Ohio CtApp, FranklinCty, 
12/13/88): 
If members of defendant 's race have not been 
excluded from jury service by prosecution's use of 
peremptory challenges, prosecution need not ex-
plain its use of peremptory challenges to exclude 
members of another race from jury, in absence of 
demonstration by defendant that such exclusion 
was systematic and results in prejudice to defend-
ant or, in effect, denied him fair trial; white 
criminal defendant who challe.nged prosecution's 
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exercise of peremptory challenges to dismiss 
black potential jurors did not establish that jury 
that tried case did not include at least some black 
members, or that he was somehow prejudice from 
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges . 
Question presented: Does white criminal de-
fendant have standing, under Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 54 LW 4425 (1986), to 
challenge prosecution's removal of black prospec-
tive jurors? 
Petition for certiorari filed 6/30 / 89 , by Ran-
dall M . Dana and Robert L Lane, both of Co-
lumbus, Ohio. 
89-1080 BOA RD OF EDUCA TION OF OKLA-
HOMA CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS v. DOWELL 
Desegregation-Dissolution of decrees-Unitary 
status. 
Ruling below (CA 10, 10/ 6/ 89) : 
School board's attempt to alter court-approved 
desegregation plan, in light of changes in demo-
graphics and fact that system may now be consid-
ered "unitary," violates original injunction since 
changes are not sufficiently narrow to affect only 
condi tions that warrant them, unitariness alone is 
insufficient to warrant change, and no hardship 
that was unforeseen at time original plan was 
adopted has been demonstrated to exist and thus 
justify altering original injunctive decree under 
US v. Swift & Co. 286 U.S. 106 (1932). 
Questions presented: (I) Should compulsory 
desegregation decree remain operative after for-
merly de jure school system achieves unitary 
status? (2) Does traditional standard for dissolu-
tion of injunctive decrees involving private par-
ties, as enunciated in United States v. Swift & 
Co. 286 U.S. 106 (1932), govern dissolution of 
s~hool desegregation decrees? (3) What affirma-
tive desegregation obligations, if any, does for-
merlx de jure school system have following its 
elimination of official discrimination and achieve-
me~t of unitary status? (4) Subsequent to 
achievement of un ita ry status, is school board 's 
action to adopt elementary neighborhood school 
plan that curtails compulsory busing scrutinized 
by board's lack of discriminatory intent, or by 
plan's racially disproportionate effect? (5) What 
are proper criteria for determining whether uni-
tary status has been maintained? (6) Did court of 
appeals afford sufficient deference to factual 
findings of district court in compliance with An-
derson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (l985)? 
Petition for certiorari filed 1/3/89, by Ronald 
L. Day, and Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & 
Moon, both of Oklahoma City, Okla. 
Criminal Law and Procedure 
/89-6332 MINNICK v. MISSISSIPPI 
Interrogation- Re{juest for counsel- Re-initi-
ation of questioning. 
Ruling below (Miss SupCt, 551 S02d 77): 
By its own terms, rule of ~dwards v. Arizona, 
451 L!.S .. 477 (I9~ I), agaInst police-initiated, 
custodIal InterrogatIOn of defendant who has in-
voked right to counsel does not apply once coun-
sel has been provided to defendant, and there-
fore, Edwards was not vio!ated by interr~gation 
or accused who, prior to Interrogation , invoked 
right to counsel and then spoke with appointed 
counsel; accused who had advice of counsel and 
who was again warned that he had right to 
c.ounsel, and who continued to speak with detec-
tIV~, even ~hough he expressly refused to sign 
:-valv~r of rlg~ts , nonetheless made knowing and 
Intelhgent waIver of his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel. 
Question presented : Once accused has ex-
pressed hIS deSIre to deal with law enforcement 
offi<:ers only t~ro~gh counsel, may police re-initi-
ate InterrogatIOn In absence of counsel as soon as 
accused has completed one consultation with 
lawyer? 
Petition for c.ertiorari filed 12/ 19/8 9, by Clive 
~Stafford SmIth, of Atlanta, Ga. 
j 89-7272 HARMELIN v. MICHIGAN 
Sentencing ~ Life imprisonment - Possession of 
drugs - Cruel and unusual punishment. 
Ruling below (Mich CtApp, 176 MichApp 
524): 
Mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for 
conviction of possession of more than 650 grams 
of cocaine does not violate Eighth Amendment's 
ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 
Question presented: Does mandatory sentence 
of life imprisonment without possibility of parole 
in this case constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment? 
Petition for certiorari filed 4 / 2/90, by Ronald 
Harmelin, pro se, of Plymouth, Michigan. 
A9-839 ARIZONA v. FULMINANTE 
Confessions- Voluntariness of inmate's confes-
sion to informer-Promise of protection from 
other inmates-Harmless error. 
First ruling below (Ariz SupCt, 6/16/88): 
Inmate acting as government informer exerted 
improper coercion, thereby vitiating voluntariness 
of confession given by inmate-defendant, by 
promising that if defendant told him truth about 
rumor then circulating at prison that defendant 
had killed child, informer would protect him from 
other other inmates who had been giving defend-
ant "rough" treatment because of rumor; error in 
admitting confession was harmless, however, in 
view of proper admission of similar and even 
more explicit confession defendant gave to 
another. 
Second ruling below (Ariz SupCt, 7/ II /89): 
On reconsideration of earlier opinion, conclu-
sion tha t erroneous adm;ssion of confession was 
harmless is changed in light of authority holding 
that admission of coerced confession can never be 
harmless error; accordingly, conviction must be 
reversed. 
Questions presented : (I) Did state supreme 
court err in failing to apply totality-of-circum-
stances test in addressing question whether defen-
dant's confession to inmate-informer was made 
voluntarily? (2) Did court err in holding that 
confession was coerced by inmate-informer's im-
plied promise to protect defendant from other 
inmates who were subjecting him to rough treat-
ment, in view of fact that defendant never ex-
pressed any fear of other inmates and never 
sought inmate-informer's protection? (3) Can er-
roneous admission of involuntary confession be 
subject to harmless error a nalysis in case in which 
there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, including 
second, voluntary confession, and there has been 
no especially egregious conduct by law enforce-
ment officials ? 
Petition for certiorari filed 11 /17/89, by Rob-
ert K. Corbin, Ariz. Atty. Gen., Jessica Gifford 
Funkhouser, Chief Counsel for Crim. Div., and 
Barbara M. Jarrett, Asst. Atty. Gen. 
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89-1715 BURNS v . REED 
~r?sec.utori~1 immunity-Use of hypnosis- Par-
ticipatIOn In search warrant application and 
arrest. 
Ruling below (CA 7, 894 F2d 949, 46 CrL 
1426) : 
State prosecutor's conduct in advi sing police 
officers to hypnoti ze assa ult suspect. which offi-
c.ers had been taught was unacceptable investiga-
tive technIque, was prosecutorial rather than in-
vestigative function and, therefore, is shielded by 
absolute immunity from 42 USC 1983 action 
brough~ by s~spect; simila rly, prosecutor's act of 
presentll?-g eVidence during probable cause hear-
Ings, which allegedly included elicitation of false 
testi~ony from police officers, was prosecutorial 
and IS therefore covered by immunity. 
questions presented: (I) [s deputy prosecutor 
entitled to al?solute immunity when he gives ap-
proval to pollce conduct that is known or should 
be known to him to be improper? (2) Is deputy 
pros~cutor entitled to absolute immunity when, in 
~eekIng search warrant in probable cause hear-
tn~,. he intentionally fails to fully inform court by 
faIlIng to stat.e that arrestee's alleged confession 
was made whIle arrestee was under hypnosis and 
that arrestee had persistently denied committing 
any cnme before and after hypnosis? (3) Is 
deputy prosec~tor entitled to absolute immunity 
when he participates In unlawful arrest, given 
fact that under state law prosecutor possesses 
same ar~e~t. po~e~s . as police officers? (4) Are I 
s~ch actiVItIes IndIVidually and collectively out-
side protect~d activit,ies of initiating prosecution 
and present~n~ s~ate s case? (5) Is question of 
wh~ther actIvIty IS. Investi~ative one for jury to 
decIde, when veracIty of wItnesses and conflict in 
testimony do not define issue of immunity purely 
as matter of law? 
. Petition for certiorari filed 5/7/90, by Michael 
K. Sutherlin, of Indianapolis, Ind. 
Other Constitutional law Issues 
/89-1215 AUTO WORKERS v. JOHNSON CON-
TROLS INC. 
Sex-Fetal protection policy-Employer's 
justification. 
Ruling below (CA 7, 886 F2d 871, 58 LW 
2193,50 FEP Cases 1628) : 
Business necessity defense shields battery man-
ufacturer's fetal protection policy, which excludes 
women of childbearing age from high lead expo-
sure jobs, from liability under Title VII of 1964 
Civil Rights Act, and policy is also justified under 
bona fide occupational qualification defense; ani-
mal research evidence does not present type of 
solid scientific data necessary for reasonable fact-
finder to reach non-speculative conclusion that 
father's exposure to lead presents same danger to 
unborn child as that resulting from mother's 
exposure. 
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Questions presented: ( I ) Where employer poli -
cy excludIng all ferule women from certain jobs 
because of concerns for health of any fetus that 
those women may conceive is challenged as un-
lawful gender discrimination violative of Title 
V II of 1964 Civil Rights Act: (a) does plaintiff or 
9ef~ndant bear burden of proving that employer's 
JustIficatIOn for excludIng women from certain 
job~ meets Title VII standards? (b) is that justifi-
catIOn Judged under explicit provisions of statu-
tory a~rma~ive def~nse for bona fide occupation-
al quallficatlOns or IS employer entitled to assert 
additional, broader "legitimate business justifica-
~ion" defense not explicitly stated in statute? (c) 
I~ only statuto!'y bona fide occupational qualifica-
tIon defense IS available, does fetal protection 
purpos~ cO.me wi~hin bounds of that defense? (2) 
Are sCIentIfic animal studies insufficient as ma t-
ter of law to demonstrate significant risk to 
humans due to exposure to toxic substance? 
Petition for certiorari filed 1/ 29 / 90, by Jordan 
Rossen and Ralph O . Jones, both of Detroit., 
MICh., Marsha S. Berzon, of San Francisco Ca-
lif., Carin Ann Clauss, of Madison, Wis .,' and 
Laurence Gold, of Washington, D.C. 
/ 89-1279 PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE 
CO. v . HASLIP 
Punitive damages-Due process-Appellate re-
view. 
Ruling below (Ala SupCt, 553 S02d 537) : 
Award of punitive damages against insurance 
company, based on fraudulent acts of individual 
that jury found, based on sufficient evidence, to 
be its agent, was supported by adequate findings 
of trial judge stating why law did not authorize 
him to order remittitur, and did not violate First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Questions presented: (I) Does Alabama law 
violate due process by allowing jury to award 
punitive damages as matter of "moral discre-
tion," without adequate standards as to amount 
necessary to punish and deter and without neces-
sary relationship to amount of actual harm 
caused? (2) Did Alabama law violate insurance 
company's right to due process under Fourteenth 
Amendment by allowing punitive damages to be 
awarded against it under respondeat superior the-
ory? (3) Was amount of punitive damages in this 
case excessive, in violation of insurance com-
pany's due process right to be free of grossly 
excessive, disproportionate damages awards? (4) 
Must suit below, although nominally civil, be 
considered criminal in nature as to punitive dam-
ages awarded therein, entitling insurance com-
pany to protection under Fifth, Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments? (5) Does Alabama law 
discriminate against those defendants subjected 
to open-ended punitive damages by limiting 
amount of such damages that may be awarded 
against other classes of defendants, without ra-
tional basis? (6) Were constitutional defects in 
award of punitive damages against insurance 
company cured by judicial review and potential 
for remittitur? 
Petition for certiorari filed 2/7/90, by Bruce 
A. Beckman, Vicki W .W . Lai, and Adams Duque 
& Hazeltine, all of Los Angeles, Calif., and J . 
Mark Hart, Ollie L. Blan Jr., Bert S . Nettles, 
and Spain, Gillon, Grooms, Blan & Nettles, all of 
Birmingham, Ala . 
89-1598 EASTERN AIRLINES INC. v. FLOYD 
Warsaw Convention-Air carrier liability for 
emotional injury. 
Ruling below (CA II, 872 F2d 1462, 57 L W 
2645): 
Cause of action for emotional injury unaccom-
panied by physical harm is cognizable under 
Warsaw Convention; Montreal Agreement, 
which followed Warsaw CO{1vention, is consistent 
with that interpretation. 
Questions presented: (I) I n view of presumed 
liability under Warsaw Convention for death, 
wounding, or any other bodily injury, is air carri-
er liable for fright, psychic injury, or emotional 
distress absent objective bodily injury or absent 
any physical manifestation of injury? (2) Does 
Montreal Agreement, which modifies Warsaw 
Convention and which eliminates air carrier's 
"due care" defense, make international air carri-
ers insurers of their passengers against any fright, 
psychic injury, or emotional distress absent show-
ing of objective bodily injury or absent physical 
manifestations of injury? 
Petition for certiorari filed 4/ 10/ 90, by John 
Michael Murray, Aurora A. Ares, and Thornton, 
David, Murray, Richard & Davis, P.A ., all of 
Miami, Fla ., and Linda Singer Stern. 
'89-1436 U.S. v. R. ENTERPRISES INC. 
Subpoenas-Business records- Enforcement. 
Ruling below (US. v. Under Seal (In re Grand 
Jury 87:3 Subpoena Duces Tecum ), CA 4, 884 
F2d 772, 45 CrL 2441): 
Subpoena duces tecum ordering production of 
business records is not enforceable, under Fed.R. 
Crim.P. 17(c), if records would not be relevant 
and admissible at trial. 
Question presented: Must govern~ent, in order 
to enforce compliance with grand JU!'y subpoena 
for corporate business records, establish that ~ub­
poenaed materials would be relevant and admiSSI-
ble at trial on merits? 
Petition for certiorari filed 3/12/90, by Ken-
neth W. Starr, Sol. Gen., Edward S .G . Dennis 
Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., William C. Bryson, Dpty. 
Sol. Gen., and Lawrence S . Robbins , Asst. to Sol. 
Gen. 
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SUPREME COURT PREVIEW 
WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE 1990-91 
TERM 
Institute of Bill of Rights Law 
Williamsburg, Virginia 
September 21-22, 1990 
Panelists 
Professor Lea Brilmayer 
Yale Law School 
Drawer 401A Yale Station 
New Haven, CT 06520 
(203) 432-4964 
Richard Carelli 
The Associated Press 
2021 K Street, NW #606 
Washington, DC 20006 
(202) 828-6400 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky 
University of Southern California Law Center 
University Park 
Los Angeles, CA 90089 
(213) 743-7221 
Professor Walter Dellinger 
Duke University School of Law 




1627 K Street NW, #1100 
Washington, DC 20006 
(202) 452-8250 
Professor Neal Devins 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law 
College of William and Mary 




700 National Press Building 
Washington, DC 20045 
(202) 383-6026 
Bruce Fein 
562 Innsbruck Avenue 
Great Falls, VA 22066 
(703) 759-5011 
Professor Michael J. Gerhardt 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law 
College of William and Mary 
Williamsburg, VA 23185 
(804) 221-3852 
Unda Greenhouse 
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